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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R.

J.

DAlT~I

CONSTRUCTION
C·O}\fp . A. :KY, a. corporation,
Plain tiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

THO~IAS

B. CHILD . and C. \)T.
CHILD·, co-partners doing business
under the name and style of Thomas
B. Child and Company,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 7790

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts does not cover the
facts. In many instances matters which are stated to
be faets were counsel's view of what he would like the
facts to be and not what the evidence showed. We have
accordingly deemed it advisable to make our own statement of the facts and to incorporate as nearly as possible
the evidence given by the parties rather than our own
conclusions as to what that evidence might be.
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This is an appeal froin a judgment dismissing the
action, (R. 60, 97). The motion to dismiss was made at
a pre-trial hearing at which both plaintiff and defendants
were represented by their counsel, (R. 52, 53). Attorneys
for plaintiff at the sa1ne hearing moved for judgment
in plaintiff's favor with the case to be submitted to the
jury for determination of damages only, (R. 52). On
October 26, 1951, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the action and denied the plaintiff's motion, and the case was ordered dismissed, (R. 59). The attorneys for the plaintiff on December 5, 1951, submitted
to the trial judge a formal order dismissing the case
which was signed and filed on that date, (R. 60). The attorneys for plaintiff did not request the trial court at that
time to make any findings of fact and did not submit any
wri,tten findings to the court and thereafter on December
21 filed a notice appealing from the order of December
5, 1951, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the
action and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, (R. 97).
This appeal is accordingly from the order of dismissal
which was prepared and submitted to the tria~ court by
the plaintiff.
1

THE PLEADINGS
According to the complaint, (R. 1-2), the plaintiff
was a California corporation qualified to do business
in Utah, and as general contractor had submitted a
bid, and on June 29, 1950, was awarded a contract to construct certain firewalls in buildings at the Utah General
Depo1t, Ogden, Utah. It was further alleged in the comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plaint that plaintiff's bid on the project was in part based
upon a bid dated June 23, 1950, submitted by the defendants as a proposed subcontractor in which the defendants proposed to furnish all labor and materials necessary for the completion of the brick work on the firewalls
for a consideration of $91,392.00; that the plaintiff
accepted the bid made by the defendants and in conformity therewith submitted a contract dated July 11, 1950,
to be executed by the defendants, but that the defendants
refused to execute the same; that the plaintiff vvas thereby obliged to do the brick work covered by the defendants' bid at a cost to it of $79,500.00 over the amount
of defendants' bid.

By their answer, (R. 3-5), the defendants admitted
that the plaintiff, as general contractor, was awarded the
contract; admitted that the defendants had submitted
to the plain tiff a proposal dated June 23, 1950, to furnish
all labor and materials necessary for the completion of
the brick work on the firewalls, but denied that the plaintiff had accepted the defendants' proposal and alleged
that under date of July 11, 1950, the plaintiff mailed the
defendants a contract for their signature 'vhich contract
was not in conformity with defendants' proposal and wa.s
not an acceptance thereof and was never signed by the
defendants. The defendants further alleged that the contract tendered by the plaintiff varied in material p-rovisions from the defendants' proposal. The answer denied
that the plaintiff sustained any damage by reason of any
action or conduct on the part of the defendants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE PROCEEDINGS
R. C. Riding, who testified that he was plaintiff's
superintendent of construction, (R. 14), and Thomas B.
Child, one of the defendant partners, were the only persons representing either of the parties between whom
any conversations were had relative to the issues in the
case. All of the preliminary negotiations in connection
with the submitting of the bid were· handled on behalf of
plaintiff by Riding exclusively, (Deposition 5, R. 32, 50).
The defendants took the pre-trial deposition of Riding,
and the plaintiff took the pre-trial deposition of Child,
in which all conversations and dealings betwe-en them
were covered. These depositions are a part of this record
and consist of 118 pages beginning at R. 102.
On S·eptember 29, 1951, the attorneys for the respective parties entered into a written stipulation, (R.
14-29), the purpose of which as stated in the opening
paragraph the-reof, was "to enable the court to determine
'vhether the plaintiff as a matter of law accepted or rejected the , defendants' bid p-roposal." This stipulation
further provided that the de-positions of R. C. Riding
and Thomas B. Child might be opened and published
and were made a part of the stipulation in order to fully
show the testimony offered by each of said parties with
such exceptions as we-re noted in the stipulation, (R. 14).
On October 16, 19·51, the- case came on for pre-trial
hearing before Judge Ellett, (R. 30-55), at which time
the- Specifications covering the firewalls were received
in evidence and marked Exhibit "A"; also Addendum
No. 1 which was dated June 12, 1950, was received in
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evidence and Inarked Exhibit ~'B," (R. 36). The proposed
subcontract \Yhich "yas 1nailed out to the defendants by
the plaintiff \Yas received a8 Exhibit '·C," and the Plans
in connection \Yi th the proposed firevvalls were received
as Exhibits ~~n" and ~~E," (R. 38). A Subcontract Agreement dated July 31, 1950, bet\veen Clark Ivory and the
plaintiff for the brick \York on said project vvas received
and marked Exhibit ~•F'." ..c\.t the pre-trial the defendants' counsel conceded that the court might use the information in the stipulation or in the depositions as well as
the exhibits for the purpose of detern1ining as a matter
of law whether or not there was a contract. However,
in the event that the court ruled that there was a contract
and ordered the case to be tried to determine the damages, the defendants' counsel reserved the right to pTesent the evidence to the jury not for the purpose of having the jury rule on the question decided by the court,
but merely so that it could have the whole picture before
it and know what the case was about in assessing the
damages, (R. 31). There is. no evidence in the record
that the plaintiff ever withheld its consent that the trial
judge might consider all of the evidence including the depositions for the p·urpose of determining as a matter of
law whether there was or was not a contract. In fact,
the stipulation, in which the depositions were incorporated in full, was for the very purpose of enabling the
court to rule on the _question as a matter of law, the defendants only reserving the right to prove a custom as to
one phase of the Specifications in the event that should
be necessary to the decision of the case, and the plain tiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reserving the right to object to the introduction of testilnony relative to any such custom, (R. 28-29, 49, 50).
At the close of the pre-trial conference the court
advised that he had enough information on which he
thought he could rule whether there was a contract or not
and 'vhether he could disn1iss the action, (R. 51). He at
that time invited both parties to make 1notions. The def~ndants 1noved for a dis1nissal of the case, (R. 53), and
the plaintiff n1oved for a judg1nent of liability against the
defendants with the only issue to be submitted at the trial
being the da1nages to which the plaintiff might be entitled, (R. 52). Thereupon the court made and entered
its pre-trial order indicating that the issue of law to be
determined was "\vhether a contract had been entered into
between the plaintiff and the defendants. The pre-trial
order further provided that if there were no contract,
then the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice, but if there were a contract between the parties, there would then be a question of fact as to the
1neasure of the damages to be awarded the plaintiff, (R.
56). The pre-trial order further provided that all pleadings were 1nerged in the pre-trial ordeT and the only
issues of law or of fact to be detern1ined upon the trial
of the lawsuit were those contained in the orde~r, (R. 57).
Arguments on the motion were heard on October 20,
1951, and each party submitted written memorandums in
support of his position which are a part of this record,
(R. 67-96). On Octobe~r 26, 1951, a minute entry was
made, by the court indicating that the defendants' motion
to dismiss was granted and the plaintiff's motion denied,
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(R. 59). On Dece1nber 5, 1 D31, a for1nal order disinissing
the nrtion 'Yas signed by Judge Ellett and entered b~- the
Clerk, (R. 60). ~rhis order had been prepared by plaintiff's attorneys and subn1itted by the1n to the court for
s1gn1ng-.
THE

E\~IDENCE

The facts presented to the court by deposition, stipulation or exhibits are as follo:\vs:
Prior to June :20, 1950, the· United States Army
Engineers issued an Invitation to contractors to submit
bids for the construction of fire"\valls in cer.tain buildings
located at the l~ tah General Depot, Ogden, Utah, in strict
accordance "Tith Plans and Specifications prepared therefor, (R. 15, 35). The Specifications, (Exhibit "A"), had
been an1ended by Addendum No. 1, (Exhibit "B"), dated
June 12, 1950, (R. 15). The Invitation for Bids wa~ included within the S-pecifications and is found on the first
page thereof. Paragraph 3 of the Invitation for Bids
reads as follows:
"The right is reserved, as the interest of the
Government may require, to reject any and all
bids, to waive any informality in bids received,
and to accept or reject any or all items of any bid,
unless the bidder qualifies such bid by specific
limitation."
The plaintiff was a California corporation with offices in Inglewood, California, (R. 14), and prior to June
20, 1950, was preparing estimates as general contractor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for the sub1nission of a bid on this firewall project, (R.
15). Richard C. Riding conducted all of the preliminary
negotiations and all of the work on behalf of the plaintiff
in connection with subn1itting its bid on the· project,
(Deposition 5, R. 15).
On or about June 20, 1950, Riding contacted Thomas
B. Child, one of the defendant partners, by telephone and
asked Child if he wished to submit a bid for the brick
work. Child replied that he would if he could see the
drawings and specificati<?ns. Accordingly, on the evening
of June 20, 19i50, Riding delivered to Mr. Child at his
horne a set of the drawings and specifications and left
them with Child. No copy of Addendum No.1 or the Plan
in connection therewith was ever furnished to Child by
Riding or Daum, and Child had never seen Addendum
No. 1 and knew nothing about it at the time of making
his bid, (Deposition 6, 7, 8, 94, R. 15).
On the 1norning of June 22, 1950, Child telephoned
his bid on the brick work to Mr. Riding's home at Tooele.
Riding was not in but Mrs. Riding took down the bid in
the total sum of $91,392.00 for the brick work. The bid
opening was scheduled for 2:00 P.M. June 22, 1950, and
prior to that time the plaintiff submitted in one lump
sum its bid as general contractor for the entire project,
which with rolling steel doors, was in the sum of $190,392.00, (R. 16).
Prior to submitting its bid the plaintiff had also requested bids for the brickwork from other subcontractors, two of whom were Alvin Watkins and Henry L.
Ashton. Watkin's bid, according to Riding, was $151,-
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734.00 and Ashton's bid "'"as $105,000.00. Riding clahued
that . A.shton had n1ade a n1istake as to the date of the bid
opening and that his bid "'"as actually not received until
one hour after the tin1e set for bid opening, (Deposition
16, 17) ...A. fourth bid for the brick\vork 'vas subsequently
obtained from Clark Ivory in the sum of $95,000.00 and a
subcontract \vas in fact entered into between the plaintiff and Clark Ivory in that stun for the brick\vork, (Deposition 17, R. 17, 48, 49, Exhibit "F").

The brickwork was covered by Section 3 of the Specifications, (Exhibit ''A"), found at Page 3.1 thereof. Paragraph 3-01 reads as follows: "This section covers all
masonry work." Other sections of the S.pecifications related to general conditions, special conditions, earthwork, concrete, sheet metal work, miscellaneous metal,
carpentry, roofing and removal and salvage of roof
trusses.
Addendum No. 1, (Exhibit "B"), provided for the
use of sliding instead of rolling fire doors in the firewalls, and attached thereto is a drawing showing the
wall construction for the use of the sliding doors. It
also changed Sheet 2 of the original Plans requiring "reinforced pilaster footings," and also provided: "Masonry
work ·shall not be started until concrete foundation has
been in place at least seven days."
According to both Child and Riding the next conversation between them took place by telephone. a day or two
after the bids were· opened, (Deposition 1'5, 96}. Both
testified that Riding told Child that his bid was low for
the brick work and that Child was requested to confirm
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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his bid in writing 'vhich Child did by letter dated June
23, 1950, (Deposition 1-1-, 19, 96, 97. R. 17-18). The written bid \Y-as the sarne as the verbal bid except that the
written bid contained a post script, "add for each firedoor if filled $175.00," which was not included in the
verbal bid, (Deposition 11-13, 94, 95, R. 18, 39). This post
script was written in by Child because Riding in this
telephone conversation asked what charges there would
be if the firedoors referred to in the Specifications were
bricked in, (R. 18-19). Child further testified that in this
conversation Riding said :
"You know how things are. It takes the Government quite a while to decide· what they want,
but I think after we get things fixed up for it we
will give you a form of contract." (Deposition 97,
R. 17).
Child further testified that Riding at this time gave hin1
to understand that the plaintiff did not have the job,
(Deposition 97, R. 17).
According to Riding the next conversation which he
had with Child as near as he could reme-mber wa.s about
July 3, (Deposition 19, R . 20). At this time he called
to see about placing of reinforcing in the brick work and
asked Child if he wanted to place it himself or through
another subcontractor, to which Child repJied that he
would rather place it himself p·rovided it was all bent,
cut and designed properly, (Deposition 20, R. 20). Child
admitted having a conversation with Riding where mention was made about placing of reinforced steel on the
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job, but said that thi~ occurred in eonnection 'vi th the
previou~ telephone conYer:sa.tion a day or two after the
bids \Yere opened, (Dep·osition 98, 99, R. 20). Whatever
the date of this conYersation \Yas, Riding admitted that
the plaintiff did not at the tin1e thereof have any contract
\Yith the Govern1nent and had not accepted Child's proposa1, but that the conversation \vas still of a preliminary
nature, (Deposition :20, R. 20). l\Ir. Riding testified as
follows:
~'Q.

..At this tin1e (of the conversation regarding
placing the reinforcing steel) you didn't have
any contract yourself with the government,
did you?

A. No.
Q. And of course you hadn't given Mr. Child
any contract or accepted his prop,osal, had
you?
A. No.
Q. This was still just preliminary negotiation,
is that correct~
A. That is right." (Deposition 20, R. 20).
By letter dated June 29, 1950, addressed to plaintiff
at its Inglewood, California office, the Corp·s of Engineers advised plaintiff that its bid had been accepted in
the sum of $190,392.00 and enclosed a contract for signature which plaintiff signed and returned, (R. 19, 20).
While the general contract between the Government and
the plaintiff was dated June 29, the contract was admittedly not signed by the plaintiff on that date as it was
mailed out from the Engineer's Office in San F'rancisco
to the plaintiff's office in Inglewood, California, by letter
dated June 29, 1950, (R. 19). Under date of July 10, 1950,
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the engineers issued for1nal notice to the plaintiff to
proceed and to commence the work within ten days after
receipt of notice. This communication was received by
the plaintiff at Inglewood, California, on July 13, (R. 21).
On July 11, 1950, plaintiff mailed a letter from its
Inglewood, California office to the defendants enclosing
contract for signature. This letter with the proposed
contract was received by defendants at Salt Lake City,
Utah, about July 13 or 14, (R. 21, 22). A copy of the
proposed subcontract is in the record marked Exhibit
"C." It was signed on behalf of plaintiff by Wade A.
Perong, Vice-President. The contract was a printed
form contract with certain words typed in, including the
following:
"TIME IS THE ESSENC·E OF' THIS CONTRACT. GENERAL CONTRACT TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 120 CALEND·AR DAYS.
$50.00 PER DAY PENALTY THEREAF·TERSUB-CONTRACTOR TO COMPLETE HIS
WORK AS S.CHEDULED."
According to both p·arties the next conversation
which they had was by telephone and took place on July
14, (Deposition 20-21, 99-100, R. 22). At this time according to Riding he called Child for an appointment to have
him go to Ogden, meet the rest of the: subcontractors
and get Child's opinions of how he would like to handle
his part of the work. According to Riding Child made an
appointment to ride up with him to Ogden the following
morning and no mention was made to Child about any
contract that was mailed out from the plaintiff's Ingle-
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'vood Office, and so far as Riding then kne'v Child had
not received any such contrart, (Deposition 20, 21, R. 22).
Child's version of this conversation was that Riding had
called hin1 and "~anted hin1 to go up to Ogden and go over
the job 'Yith hin1, but that he told Riding that he had receiYed a form of contract fron1 the plaintiff; that he and
his partners had 1net together and decided that the contract was not in conformity 'vith their p·roposal and that
they were not going to sign the job up, (Deposition 99,
R. 25 ).
The next conversation between Riding and Child
took place at Child's home in Salt Lake on the following
morning, to-wit, July 15, (Deposition 21-22, 100, R. 23,
25). According to Riding at this time Child told him
that he had met with his brothers the night before and
they had decided not to go through with the contract;
that the contract was lying on the table and was dated
July 11, (Deposition 22); that Child objected to the
$50.00 a day penalty provision in the typewritten insert
in the proposed contract, (Deposition 23, R. 23), reading
as follows:
"Time is of the essence of this contract. General contract to be completed within 120 days.
$50.00 per day penalty thereafter. Subcontractor
to comp·lete his work as scheduled."
Riding testified that he offered to strike the $50.00
a day penalty clause and initial it then and there, but
he did not recall offering to strike the time limit feature
fron1 the contract. Riding testified that he was not an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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officer of the plaintiff corporation, (Deposition 23, R.
23); that there was no schedule attached to the subcontract for1n and nothing in the S·pecifications showing the
manner in which the defendants' work would be scheduled, and that nothing had ever been discussed or agreed
upon with the defendants as to any schedule of work by
them or the other subcontractors so that the schedule
referred to in the typewritten insert in the subcontract
agreement was something that would have to be worked
out by conversation and dealings with all of the subcontractors and the plaintiff, (Deposition 24-26, R. 23). Riding also testified that he told Child that the penalty provision in the proposed subcontract agreement should not
have been in the-re; that it wasn't according to the Specifications and his office had no reason for putting it in,
(Deposition 27, 28, 102, R. 23). Child testified that in this
conversation he told Riding that the time limit and penalty clause were not according to their proposal and could
not be acce·pted in view of conditions such as the Korean
War; that he also mentioned Addendum No.1 which was
referred to in the contract but which he· had never seen.
He claimed that Riding never offered to strike anything
from the contract and that he took it in any event that
Riding didn't have the right to alter the contract but this
would have to be done by the people, in plaintiff's California office who had made the contract and sent it to
him. Child also claimed that in this conversation Riding
said that there· was no time limit in the Specifications and
that the plaintiff had no business writing it in the~ contract, (Deposition 101-102, R. 25, 26). Also in connection
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with this conYersation Riding clailned that he brought up
the question of brick and asked ~lr. c~hild \\~hat he should
do about the brick: that Child said he had on order one
1nillion t\YO hundred thousand briek for the project and
would turn it oYer to hi1n, (R. ~3-~4). Riding further
testified as follo,vs:

HQ. Did he say he had an order, or did he say

A.

Q.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

he \vould do \vhat he could with the brick coinpany to get your order~ Do you remember
specifically on that~
That I can't say, if he directly had an order,
but he told me he had on order one million
two hundred thousand brick for this particular project.
You can state then that prior to the time this
contract was mailed out to him by your Inglewood office, this contract dated July 11th,
~Ir. Child would have no possible basis of
holding you under any agreement, would he~
l\IR. WATSON: We object to that as
argumentative and asking for a conclusion.
MR. STRONG: I will re-frame the question.
Prior to the time this contract dated July 11th
was sent out, Mr. Child would have no basis
for making any order of brick, would he~
He should.
He had never received any word prior to that
time from you or your company relative to
this bid proposal he had submitted~
He knew he was low bidder.
That is all he knew though~
And the general practice would be to pTotect
you on your buying power on your low bid.
I mean he didn't have any official right, or
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A.

"Q.

A.

Q.
A.

any confirmation from your office prior to
the· time this contract was mailed out~
No." (Deposition 27).
* * •JI:
You mentioned about the brick, and you talked about him protecting you or something on
the order of brick or arrangements he had.
What was the outcome of that~
He immediately got on the phone and caHed
a man, Calhoun, if I know the name properly
-or Cahoon-and told him to transfer his
order to R. J. Daum, that I would be right
down to see him.
Did he say 'his order,' those words~
I couldn't swear to that.

* * *
Q. Whether it was an order or just a statement
to the brick yard, you don't know, do you~
A. No." (Deposition 28).
Mr. Child testified that Riding mentioned a diffi- .
culty about getting bricks and requested him to turn over
any priority which he might have. Child then testified:

"Q. What did you say~ (Deposition 108).
"A. I told him I would call up; any influence I
had to get him the bricks I would sure be glad
to help him to do it.
Q. H.ad you made arrangements for the brick?
A. No; I had told the~m tentatively I was figuring that job, that I was expecting to sign up
with Daum for the job.
Q. And you had p·ut in an order for a million and
some· hundred thousand brick~
A. No, I just told them I expected to get the job.
Q. Did you at that time call Mr. Cahoon and ask
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_A._.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

hiin to turn oyer an order yon had for brick
to ~lr. Riding'?
H~IR. STRONG: I object to that question
on the ground it is asslnning something not in
evidence. He has just stated he had no order
"yith the brick company."
(last question read by the reporter.)
I think I spoke to nir. Andrew Bath, the
salesn1an there, and told him I wasn't going to
ha-ve anything to do \vith the job up there
no\Y, and that anything he could do to help
them get the material I wanted him to do it.
Do you recall the substance of your arrangement as to price for the brick on the job~
No; they give us all the same price.
I an1 asking if there had been a price given to
you on this?
Yes, there had.
Did that price include a price as to the delivery on the job as \veil as a price to deliver
to the factory~
When I figured the job I asked what the price
would be delivered at the job.'' (De·position
109, R. 17, 24, 25).

The conversations referred to above were the only
conversations that took place between Riding and Child
and were all of the conversations between the parties
that would have any bearing at all on the issue. involved
in this case.
It is conceded that the defendants never did sign
any contract to do the work and never did any work on
the project, (R. 26, 28, 48). Thereafter, the plaintiff
entered into a subcontract agreement with Clark Ivory
to do the brick work for $95,000.00, (R~ 49, Exhibit "F").
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This contract was identical with that submitted to Child
with the exception that the features to which Child objected as he-reinafter pointed out were deleted therefrom.

POINTS
POINT I.
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW
DISCLOSES THAT THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS.

POINT II.
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM
WAS NOT A CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE NOR MERELY A WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF A PREVIOUS CONTRACT.

POINT III.
THE PROPOSED SUBCONTRACT ITSELF WAS NOT
AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENDANTS' BID BUT CONTAINED NEW MATERIAL WHICH MADE IT A COUNTERPROPOSAL THEREBY REJECTING DEFENDANTS' BID.

POINT IV.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY.

POINT V.
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS. NO JURY ISSUES WERE PRESENT.
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POINT \'I.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
FORMAL WRITTEN MOTION WITH NOTICE THEREOF
W'"ERE NOT REQUIRED AND IN ANY EVENT WERE
\VAlVED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT .

.ARGU~IENT
POINT I.
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW
DISCLOSES THAT THERE WAS NO CONTRACT BET\V.EEN
THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS .

. A.ppellant contends that the plaintiff by acts and
conduct had accepted the defendants' bid and that a binding contract was thereby created. In our argument we
"'"ill consider the acts and conduct allegedly constituting
an acceptance in the order set forth in the appellant's
brief.
Appellant at page 15 of its brief refers to a statement made by Child in a telephone conversation between
him and Riding on June 23 or 24. In this conversation
it was undisputed that Riding told Child that Child's bid
was low for the brick work. Riding in his deposition did
not testify in this conversation or a.t any other time that
he had ever agreed to give Child a contract. Child testified that Riding in this conversation said :
"You know how things are. It takes the Government quite a 'vhile to decide what they want,
but I think after we get things fixed up for it we
will give you a form of contract."
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We submit that the staternent quoted above did not
show an acceptance of Child's bid by Riding. At most it
merely indicated that Child might get a form of contract.
If Riding had intended to accept Child's bid at this time,
he would have said so without equivocation. His staternents in other conversations hereinafter set forth clearly
show that he did not consider there had been any acceptance of the! defendants' bid.
Defendants were one of several subcontractors from
whom the plaintiff had requested bids for the brick work.
The mere fact that the defendants' bid may have been
low, and even though plaintiff may have used defendants'
figure in submitting its own lump sum bid on the whole
project to the· Government, would not in and of itself obligate the defendants to perform merely because the Government accepted plaintiff's bid and subsequently entered
in to a con tract with it. See Williston on 0 on tracts, Sec.
31, pages 74-75 :

"* * * an ordinary advertisement for bids or
tenders is not itself an offer but the bid or tender
is an offer which creates no right until accepted.
Even though the charter of a municipality expressly requires that a contract shall be awarded
to the. lowest bidder, a contract is not formed until
the lowest b'id is in fact accepted. Though the
municipality can make a contract with no other
person than the lowest bidder, it need make no
con tract with him."
The plaintiff could accep·t or reject defendants' proposal or do the brick work itself. It had not promised
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that the defendants 'vould be given the brich: "·ork in the
event that plaintiffs bid 'Ya~ lo,v, and plaintiff 'vas
a"~arded the gene-ral contract. Paragraph 3 of the Invitation for Bids (Specification~ Exhibit ""_:\_") reads as
follo,vs:
HThe right is reserved, as the interest of the
Governn1ent 1nay require to reject any and all
bids, to "\Yaive any inforn1ality in bids received,
and to accept or reject any or all items of
any bid, unless the bidder qualifies such bid by
specific limitation."
Plaintiff clearly understood that there was reserved
to it the right to reject or accept the defendants' proposal
as plaintiff alone saw fit. This was the provision in the
Invitation for Bids. While that pTovision was 'vith reference to the entire contract, nonetheless the plaintiff by
its very position in this suit and by the proposed contract
which it subsequently tendered the defendants has taken
the position that it had all rights as against the defendants which the Government had or ·might have under the
Specifications against the plaintiff. The third paragraph
of the proposed subcontract agreement, (Exhibit "C"),
which plaintiff tendered defendants, p·rovides:

"* * * the intention being that with respect to this
subcontract, everything required of and binding
upon the Contractor shall be required of and binding upon the Sub-contractor, and all rights, privileges, options, and the exercise of discretion with
respect to said work reserved by or given to the
Owner and the Architect may be maintained and
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exercised with andjor against the Sub-contractor."
There had, accordingly, been no conditional acceptance of the defendants' bid and there was no promise to
give the defendants a contract when and if the Government accepted the plain tiff's bid.
It is further contended in appellant's brief, page 16,
that the conversation between the parties regarding the
placing of reinforcing steel indicates that there had been
an acceptance of the defendants' proposal. There is some
discrepancy between the parties as to when this conversation took place, Child claiming that Riding had talked
with him over the telpehone about placing of reinforced
steel on the job, but that this was on June 23 or 24 when
he was asked to confirm his verbal bid and was merely
for the purpose of determining just what was included
within Child's bid proposal. Riding was not sure but as
near as he could remember the conversation took place
about July 3. However, Riding admitted that at the time
of this conversation the p·laintiff did not have any contract with the Government and further admi.tted that the
plaintiff had not accepted the defendants' proposal or
given the defenda.nt any contract, but that the conversation was all of a preliminary nature. The testimony of
both Riding and Child in co,nnection with this conversation conclusively indicates that it was of a preliminary
nature. Both clearly understood that there had been no
acceptance of the defendants' proposal. Both stated that
the conversation was of a preliminary nature. Both
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recogni~~ed

that ~o1nething further
fore there could be any rontract.

nnu~t

be required be-

The next condurt or action relied upon b~, appellant
in its brief to ~ho'v an aeeeptance pertains to conversation bet,Yeen C~hild and Riding on July 15 relative to
brirks to be u~ed on the job .....\ppellant in its brief, page
lT, contends that the defendants had placed an order for
one 1nillion t\YO hundred thousand brick vvith the brick
company. This is not the case. Child had not ordered
any brick for the job. There is nothing whatsoever in the
record to support the contention made by counsel for the
appellant. In this conversation Riding readily admitted
that he couldn't say whethe·r Child told him he had an
order for the brick and "couldn't swear" that Child actually used the vvord '~order." Child testified that when
preparing his bid he had called the brick yard and got a
figure for the price of one million two hundred thousand
brick delivered at the job site. There is nothing unusual
about this practice. In fact, it would have been impossible for Child to have given a bid on the brick work without first knowing what the cost of the brick would be.
Counsel for appellant in examining Child in his deposition attempted to have him testify that he had ordered
the brick but this he did not do. He said that he had not
ordered the brick, and did not have an order for the
brick. He merely agreed to use his influence with the
brick yard to help the plaintiff get the brick. Here again
we submit that the evidence from both parties clearly
shows that Child had not placed an ordeT for any brick.
There was, accordingly, nothing in this conversation to
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indicate an acceptance. Furtherinore, Riding at this time
clearly understood that there had been no acceptance
of the defendants' proposal. He testified that at the time
of this conversation the defendants did not have any
official right or any confirmation of their bid from the
plaintiff.
In support of its argument under this heading the
appellant cites Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 Pac.
(2d) 1002. Counsel, ho-vvever, carefully refrained from
setting forth the facts in the Thornton case because they
are definitely not in point. In the Thornton case the defendants "\vere in the roofing business. The defendant
Pasch asked the plaintiff to make a bid on the hauling of
roofing for certain defense homes. The plaintiff went to
Pasch's office and wrote out his bid on a scratch pad.
Pasch took the bid and said he would take it up with
his partner and let the plaintiff know. About a week or
ten days later Pasch told the plaintiff's wife over the
telephone that they had a contract for her husband to
sign and asked her to have him come in and. sign it as
soon as possible. In response to this the plaintiff called
at Pasch's office, examined the docum.ent which was prepared for his signature. He did not sign it at that time,
but the next day returned and signed. it in Pasch's pr-esence after a short discussion which resulted in some
changes. The original was left with Pasch and the plaintiff received a copy. Neither the original or the copy
were ever signed by the defendant. The agreement
signed by plaintiff in Pasch's office was in the fo·rm of a
contract and not an offer. Pasch told the plaintiff that
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the 1cork ~vo·uld be ready about 111 a.y 26. The·se facts aecording to the lTtah Court indicated an acceptance' by the
defendant of the plaintiff's bid. However, in the case· at
bar the parties by their testiinony readily conceded that
all of these ronversations and dealings prior to receipt
of the tendered subcontract ''Tere 1nerely of a preliminary
nature and did not constitute an acceptance of the· defendants' proposal.
Appellant also relies on the case of Raff Co. v.
Murphy, 1-±7 Atl. 709. The facts in that case are clearly
distinguis'hable from those in the case at bar. There the
plaintiff was engaged in the heating business and the de:fendant in the plumbing business. The plaintiff desired
to submit a bid on a contract which called for both plumbing and heating. Since the plumbing was out of plaintiff's
line, the plaintiff asked Murphy if he was interested in
submitting a figure for the p~lumbing. Murphy agreed
to do so, u on condition that the plaintiff would not obtain
figures fro1n anyone else for that work, and would give
them the job if the plaintiff secured the contract, and
these conditions were accepted" by the the plaintiff.
The plaintiff company thereupon incorporated the defendant's bid in a combined bid covering both the heating
and plumbing work and submitted it. Plaintiff was
awarded the bid and telephoned one of the· defendants
advising him at which time this defendant informed him
of his pleasure and ap·preciation. Some two days later
the defendants called up plaintiff's office, advised that
there had been a mistake in their bid, and that they would
not go through with it.
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In that case the plaintiff at the defendant's insistence
refrained from seeking any other bids and promised to
give the defendants the job if the plaintiff secured a contract. However, in the instant case the plaintiff had secured bids from other parties, did not promise to give
the defendants a subcontract even though they might be
low bidders, and, in fact, reserved the right to reject any
and all bids. The Raff case accordingly is not in point.
We submit that the acts and conduct of the parties
shows beyond question that there had been no acceptance
of the defendants' proposal, and that both Child and Riding so understood.
POINT II.
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM
WAS NOT A CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE NOR MERELY A WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF A PREVIOUS CONTRACT.

At pages 20 and 21 of appellant's brief it is argued
that the transmittal of the subcontract form was a confirmation of a previous acceptance· and that the subcontract
form wa.s merely a written memorial of the! contract so
created. In our discussion under Point I we have shOiwn
that there had been no accep·tance of the defendants' proposal by any action or conduct. The:re, accordingly, was
no contract prior to the time that the! subcontract form
was mailed out. The mailing of the subcontract form,
therefore, could not be a confirmation of any previous
acceptance. Furthermore, as we shall point out in our
discussion under Point III, the subcontract form itself
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\Yas not an acceptance of the defendants' proposal. Counsel for appellant quote fron1 Restaternent of the La\v of
Contracts, Chapter 3, Section 26 and also quote a portion of the conunent under that section. lio,vever, they
neglected to quote the ren1a.ining portion of the cornn1ent
which reads as follo,vs :
·'On the other hand, if the preliminary agreement is incomplete, it being apparent that the
determination of certain details is deferred until
the writing is made out; or if an intention is ma.nifested in any uJay that legal obliga.tions between
the parties shall be deferred until the writing
is made, the preliminary negotiat-ions a.nd agreenz ents do not constitu.te a contract."
And again:
"If the parties indicate that the expected
document is to be the exclusive operative consummation of the negotiation, their preceding communications will not be operative as offeT or acceptance."
In order for the transmittal of the subcontract form
to be a mere memorial or confirmation of a previous contract two things must accordingly be present: (1) The
parties must have definitely agreed on all of the terms
of the proposed contract so that nothing in addition re-mained to be determined by the writing; (2) The parties
must have intended that the acts and conduct should constitute a binding agreement.
(1) By reference to Child's pToposal, (R. 18), it
will be observed that the defendants merely proposed to
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furnish labor and 1naterials to co1nplete the brick work
according to Plans and Specifications for a specified
sun1. No mention was made as to the time or manner in
which the defendants should be paid. No mention was
1nade as to any time limit within which the defendants
would complete the brick work, nor as to any penalty
that might be applied. No mention was n1ade of any schedule under which the defendants were to complete their
work. No mention was made that the defendants would
waive any rights or claims which they might have against
the contractor or any other subcontractor by reason of any
da1nages caused by any act, omission or delay on the part
of the contractor or other subcontractor. No mention was
made of Addendum No. 1. No understanding had be~en
reached as to whether the subcontractor would furnish
a performance bond. All of these matteTs were specifically covered in the tendered subcontract agreement
which also provided that there were no understandings
or agreements except as expressly stated in the, subcontract form. There is nothing in any of the convers~ations
between Riding and Child showing any agreement on any
of these particulars. Such an agreement would be necessary for a complete understanding and to make-a definite
and binding agreement. If, as ap·pellant contends, there
was an agreement prior to the time that the subcontract
form was mailed out, what were the defendants' rights
under such agreement~ When was it to commence its
work~ When was it to receive its pay~ What time limit
or penalty, if any, was to be in foree~ Where was the
plaintiff hound to any contract under which it could be
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sued~

These and nun1erous other questions 1nust be
ans"~ered and decided before there could be any 1neeting
of the minds on any contrart. ''; e, accordingly, submit
that the parties had not definitely agreed on the terms
of any rontract and that the transn1ittal of the subcontract forin could not, therefore, be a 1nere confirmation
or meinorial of a preYious contract.
( 2) The parties by their o,,~n acts and admissions
clearly indicated that all of their conversations were of a
preliminary nature and that a contract must be written
before either part:~ could be bound. Riding, in his telephone conversation with Child, a day or two following
the bid opening said he thought the defendants might
receive a contract. This in and of itself indicated that
the submission of a contract was to constitute the consummation of any acceptance of the defendants' p~roposal.
Furthermore, in the next conversation betwe·en the parties relative to the placing of reinforcing steel Riding at
that time specifically stated that the conversation was
"just preliminary negotiations" and that the p~laintiff
hadn't "accepted" Child's proposal. Riding further testified in his conversation that took place at Child's home
on July 15 just after the subcontract form had been
mailed out that the schedule referred to in thH tendered
subcontract form was itself something that was not co:vered either by the Sp·ecifications or the Plans and which
would even then have to be worked out in negotiations
between the parties. He also testified in -that conversation that prior to the time that the written contract was
mailed out the defendants had no official rights under
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their proposal or any confirmation at all from the plaintiff's office. Child, himself, had been given to understand that his propoS'al had not been accepted and that
it would have to be accepted by the· plaintiff's California
Office. The first communication which the defendants
received froln the plaintiff's c·alifornia office was the
communication dated July 11 which enclosed the proposed subcontract form.
We submit that neither of the necessary requisites
are present to make the tendered subcontract agreement
a mere memorial of a previously accepted contract. The
parties had not agreed definitely on the terms of any
such contract, and, furthermore·, they clearly and unmistakeably indicated that their conversations were only
preliminary negotiations and that all legal obligations between them should be deferred until a contract was made.
The case of Calumet Refining Co. v. Star Lubricating Co., 64 Utah 358, 230 Pac. 1028, is cited at page 21 of
appellant's brief. In that case the· defendant had purchased from the plaintiff on previous occasions at least
5 carloads of lubricating oil. Thereafter one of plaintiff's representatives entered into nego;ti~ations with the
defendant for the sale of such oil as the defendant might
need. At the termination of these negotiations the de~
fendant delivered to the plaintiff an order or contract
for the purchase of one thousand barrels of oil. There
was an exchange of telegrams between the parties. The
so called acceptance telegram contained the. additional
provision: "Te-rms one per cent ten days or thirty day
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trade acceptance." It 'vas contended that the insertion
of these tern1s in the teleg·rant constituted a qualified
acceptance. Ho,vever, the evidence indicated that in the
prior dealings between the parties the time and terms
of payn1ent had been the same as those specified in the
acceptance telegran1 and that these were the usual terms
of payrnent. Furthern1ore, on the same date that the telegram "~as sent the defendant gave the plaintiff an order
for the ship1nent of one carload of oil under the very
terms stated in the confirming telegram and this order
"~as filled by the plaintiff. The Utah Sup-reme Court
merely held that in view of the former relationship between the parties and because of the testimony as to the
custom of the trade and the fact that the plaintiff had accepted one order and filled it under the terms called for
in the telegram, the insertion of the words in the confirming telegram did not constitute a conditional acceptance.
There had been a contemporaneous construction on the
part of both parties by the acceptance and filling of the
order under the very terms specified in the telegram
which showed a complete meeting of the minds. We submit that there is no such evidence in the case at bar, and,
in fact, all of the eviden'Ce conclusively indicates that both
parties clearly understood that their conver'S'ation and
dealings were of a preliminary nature and that there
could be no contract until a written form was signed between the parties.
As indicated in the case of Wells Construction Co.
v. Goder Incinerator Co., 217 N.W. 112:
"At the outset of such an inquiry as this,
there must be kept in mind the admonition of
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Judge Taft (quoting fron1 Lyman v. Robinson, 14
Allen (Mass.) 242), that 'care should always be
taken not to construe' as a contract communications 'which the parties in tended only as a prelin1inary negotiation,' and (quoting from Rossite
v. Miller, 5 Ch. Div. 648), to prevent litigants from
being 'entrapped into contracts * * * without the
slightest ide'a that they were contracting.'"
The entire te·stimony of the parties clearly indicates
that they were simply negotiating for a possible contract
and never went beyond that stage. No agreement was
ever re'ached and no contract was ever made. In fact the
essential terms to a definite contract had never been
agreed upon. And it was the intention of both partie's
that neither could be bound until there was a. written contract.
Whether plaintiff intended its proposed contract to
be a rejection or not is wholly immaterial If it contained
new and additional matter, as we shall see in our discussion under Point III, it constituted a rejection as a matter of law. Child certainly construed the contract as a
rejection of the offer and so notified Riding by telephone
which was later eonfirmed in discussions at the Child
home.
POINT III.
THE PROPOSED SUBCONTRACT ITSELF WAS NOT
AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENDANTS' BID BUT CONTAINED NEW MATERIAL WHICH MADE IT A COUNTERPROPOSAL THEREBY REJECTING DEFENDANTS' BID.

The defendants' letter of June 23, 1950, addressed
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to the plaintiff \vas an offer \vhich required acceptance
on the part of the plaintiff before there could be any
contract. .A. s \ve have heretofore seen in our discussions
under Point8 I and II, there \Vas no acceptance by any act
or c'onduct. The letter of July 11, 1950, forwarding a
proposed subcontract for1n to the defendants was not
an acceptance of the defendants' proposal. The proposed
subcontract contained new material and was a counterproposal, W'"hieh rejected the defendants' previous offer.
Thereafter, the defendants' offer could only be revived
by a ne\v offer and such offer was never made.
In considering this proposition it should be noted
that while plaintiff's contract with the Governmen't was
dated June 29, 1950, that it was not until July 11, 1950,
that the plaintiff mailed to the defendants from its
Inglewood Office a letter enclosing the proposed subcontract agreement.
A comparison of the defendants' proposal of June
23 with the tendered subcontract agreemen~t dated July
11 conclusively shows tha;t the tendered subcontract
agreement was not an acceptance of the defendants' p·roposal but was in effeet a counter-proposal and thereby
as a matter of law amounted to a rejection of the defendants' proposal.

L
In the first place, the proposed subcontract agreement atte·mpted to bind the defendants to perform the
work according to the Plans and Specifications, "including Addendum No. 1." It is undisputed that the plaintiff
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never furnished the defendants Addendum No. 1 and that
the defendants never saw Addendum No. 1 until after
the controversy had arisen. Addendum No. 1 provided
for the use of sliding instead of rolling fire doors in the
firewalls, changed the original plans to require "reinforced pilaster footings," and also provided "Masonry
work shall no1t be started until concrete foundation has
been in place at least 7 days." This is important because
the defendants had nothing whatsoever to do with the
pouring of the concrete. This work would have to be done
by the plaintiff or through some other subcontractor over
whom the defendants would have no control. Furthermore, the pouring of the concrete itself would be dependent upon other portions of the work to be performed by
plaintiff or other subcontractors. Considering the 120
day time limit and $50.00 per day penalty clause with
which plaintiff attempted to saddle the defendants in the
proposed subcontract agreement, this proposed 7 day
limit could have disastrous results. There were 12 se·parate fire walls in all which would have to be laid in 4
buildings. However, before any of these fire· walls could
be started the work of clearing the area, cutting the
roofs, tearing up the existing floors where the wall was
to go, digging trenche·s and pouring concrete would have
to take place and in addition the defendants would have
to wait 7 days after the concrete had be·en poured on each
of the 12 fire walls before the defendants could start their
work on any of the walls, (R. 28, 4 7, 48, Deposition 3942), and there wa:s nothing in the con tract or in the specifications which required the general contractor to follow
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any specific schedule or to adopt any particular ti1ne
lin1it in the pouring of the various foundations. The
plaintiff, as general contraetor, 'vould, therefore, have it
exclusively ""'ithin its po,ver to deter1nine when the defendants could start 'vork on any of the 12 fire walls.
It is contended by appellant at page 24 of its brief
that this provision in the. Addendum· 1nade no change
'vhatsoever over the original specifications and that it
W'as trivial in any event. The answer to such argument
lies in the fact that the Government in writing the Addendum certainly did not deem that the. change was trivial or that it 'vas covered by the original Specifications,
otherwise, there \vould have been no reason for including the change in the Addendum. Furthermore, if Addendum No. 1, as claimed by plaintiff's counsel, did not
include any new features, why was it necessary for the
plaintiff to specifically insert in its proposed subcontract
agreement that the defendants' work should be in accordance with the Plans and S.pecifications, "including Addendum No. 1." We submit that the inclusion of Addendum No. 1 in the p-rop·osed subcontract agreement indicates that :it contained p-rovisions covering the brick
work which were not included in the original Plans and
Specifications, and to which the plaintiff desired that the
defendants should be subject.
The app·ellant at page 25 of its brief further argues
that any delay occasioned by the requirement that the
concrete should be in place 7 days beforre any brick work
should be started would be a delay occasioned on the part
of the plaintiff or some other subcontractor for which the
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defendants would not be. responsible. We shall point out
hereafter (infra p·. 44-46) that this is not the case, because in the proposed subcontract agreement the defendants were required to waive any and all claims for dalnages for any act, omission or delay caused by the plaintiff or any other subcontractor.
II.
The proposed subcontract agreement was in the
main a printed form of contract, but there was specifically typed in the following provision:
"Time is the essence of this contract. General
contr'aet to be completed within 120 calendar days.
$50.00 per day penalty thereafter-Subcontractor
to complete his work as scheduled."
This provision was a general time limit and penalty
clause written into the Specifications to apply as between
the Government and the plaintiff. It is true that such
provision is for the whole project. However, by inserting
such p·rovision in the proposed subcontract agreement,
the plaintiff attempts not only to charge the defendants
with the 120 day time li1nit and $50.00 per day penalty,
but in addition thereto to impose upon the defendants a
further and indefinite time limit since the defendants
were compelled to complete the brick work not only within the 120 day general time limit, but "as scheduled."
It is undisputed that no schedule was attached to the
tendered subcontract form showing the manner or time
within which the defendants' work was to be completed.
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It is further undisputed that nothing had ever been discussed or agreed upon het,veen Riding and Child as to
any schedule or thne li1nit on Child's particular portion
of the \York. It \Yas also undisputed that the work consisted of seYeral different p·hases, only one of which,
na.n1ely, the brick \vork, was to be performed by the· defendants; that before the brick work could commence
the buildings \vould have to be cleared by the Govern1nent
where the \\~ork \vas going to take place. Everything
would have to be moved out from this area. It would then
be necessary to take down the existing trusses and a p art
of the roofing because the 12 brick walls would go right
up through the ceiling. Then the concrete flooring where
the walls were to go would have to be dug out, trenches
would have to be made and the footings poured (R. 28,
47, 48, Depositions 39-42). S-even days thereafter the
brick work on such wall could commence. F'ollowing this
there \vould be other work on the roof and roofing to
complete each fire wall. Riding admitted that no time
schedule for the various phases of the work had ever been
agreed upon prior to or at the time the proposed subcontract agreement \vas mailed to the defendants. He admitted that this was something which would have to be
worked out by future negotiations.
1

The defendants took the position that. the general
tilne lim.It and penalty clause in the Sp·ecifications had no
application to their particular phase of the work. Section
3 of the Specifications Page 3.1, Subsection 301, specifically provides : "This section covers all masonry work."
C·hild testified that his bid was hased exclusively upon
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this section of the Specifications and upon the Plans.
'!,here is nothing whatsoever in the masonry section of
the Specifications or in the Plans to indrcate any time
limit or penalty clause for this particular phase of the
work or in fact for the entire project itself. It is clear
fro1n the conversations and dealings between the parties
that no time limit or penalty clause was in the contemplation of either Riding or Child and that such was definitely understood by Riding wh'en he received the defendants' proposal. The defendants' proposal as it was
clearly understood by Riding was merely to comple,te the
masonry work pursuant to the masonry section of the
Specifications and the Plans without any reference to
any time limit or penalty clause. This was definitely
understood by Riding who testified that in the conversation with Child on July 15 after Child had received the
proposed subcontract agreement that he told Child that
the typewritten provision relative to the time limit and
penalty should not have been in the subcontract agre·ement; that it wasn't in the Specifications and that the
pl'aintiff had no reason f'Or putting it in the contract.
Furthermore, when the subcontract agreement with
Clark Ivory was subsequently entered into by the plaintiff for the brick work, Riding wrdte in ink opposite the
typewritten time limit and penalty provision in his own
handwriting these words: "This is not called for in Government spec.", and initialled the same·.
It is, therefore, appHrent that the defendants' bid
was taken by Riding with the knowledge that there was to
be no time limit or penalty provision at least insofar as
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the defendantB '"ere concerned. The defendants' bid,
therefore, 1nust be interpreted in the light in which it was
so understood. See Restate1nent of the Law of Contracts,
page 7±, Section 71, subsection (c) :
·~Except

as stated in Sections 55, 70, the undisclosed understanding of either party of the
1neaning of his own 'Yords and other acts, or of the
other party's words and other acts, is material
in the formation of contracts in the following
cases and in no others :
(c) If either party knows that the other does not
intend what his words or other acts express,
this kno,vledge prevents such words or other
acts from being operative as an offer or an
acceptance."
Both Riding and Child, the only persons with whom
any dealings and conversations were had relative to the
defendants' proposal, clearly and definitely understood
that at least insofar as the brick work was concerned
there 'vas to be no time limit or penalty provision. However, as we have heretofore indicated, not only was it an
attempt to impose the general time limit upon Child, but
to include an additional limit that the defendants had
to complete their work "as scheduled" by the. plaintiff,
which would leave the defendants completely at the: plaintiff's mercy as the plaintiff might give the defendants
any particular S'chedule that it saw fit.
At pages 22 and 23 of appell,ant's brief it is claimed
that the defendants had notice when they comp~uted their
bid of the 120 day time limit and $50.00 per day penalty
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prov1s1on because of the provision in the special pro;vision of the Hpecifications. It is aecordingly argued that
when the defendants rnade their bid they knew that time
would be of the essence of their subcontract. In support
of its position the appellant cites the case of Ehret Magnesia Mfg. Co. v. Gothwaite, 149 Fed. (2d) 829. In
that case Gothwaite was engaged in the construction of
stea1n distribution systems. He entered into a written
contract with the United States to furnish certain materials and perform certain labor in connection with the
construction of a steam distribution system. The 1fagnesium Company agreed to supply the necessary pipe to
Gothwaite and to do certain of the work "in accordance
with plans and specifications." When the installation
was about complet'e, it was discovered when the steam
was turned on that heat had melted various sections of
the asphalt water proofing covering the pipe, causing
considerable damage, and to remedy the same Gothwaite was put to considerable expense. He brought this
suit to rec'Over the expense from the Magnesium c·ompany. One of the items of the plans and) specifications
required the contractor to guarantee the work for a period of one year after completion. The plans and specifications further required that the insulated pipe should be
"permanently waterproofed." Since the Magnesium
Company agreed to supply the pipe according to the
plans and specifications, the court held that it was liable
to Gothwaite for damages since the pipe which it had
furnished was not permanently waterproofed.
In th'a t case the provision in the specifications to
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\Yhich the :_j{ag-nesilnn (\)ulpany \Yas subjected related to
the very phase of the \York \Yhich it had unde-rtook to
perforin. It \Yas eontained \Yithin the very portion of the
specifications relating- to pipe. The Magnesium Con1pany
under these circu1nstances \Yas held subject to a provision of the specifications '"'·hich related to the very portion of the \\~ork \Yhich it had agreed to supply or perforin. In the instant case, however, the provision with
which the plaintiff seeks to charge the defendants was
not contained in the ~Iasonry Section of the Sp-ecifications and further1nore the masonry section specifically
provided that it included "All masonry work."
The use of the "~ords '"pursuant to Plans and Specifications" in the defendants' proposal was for the 1nere
purpose of identifying the brick work to be done, and the
manner in which it should be done pursuant to the
1nasonry subsection. It certainly was not the intention
of the defendants to incorporate in their bid proposal
all of the Plans and Specifications that might relate
between the plaintiff and the Government. See Cummings Construction Co. vs. Marbleloid Co., 51 Fed. (2d)
906, wherein the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said:
"It was far from the intention of the defendant, when it entered into the contract to lay
floors, to incorporate therein all the provisions
of the plans and specifications in the contract
between the plaintiff and the state of Maine."
See also to the same effect Guerini Stone Company
vs. P. J. Carlin Construction Company, 60 La\v Ed. 636:
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"The reference in the subcontract to the
drawings and specifications was evidently for
the mere purpose of indicating what work was
to he done, and in what manner done, by the
subcontractor. Notwithstanding occasional expressions of a different view (see Shaw v. First
Baptist Church, 44 Minn. 22, 24, 46 N.W. 146;
Avery v. Ionia County, 71 Mich. 538, 546, 547, 39
NW. 742; Stein v. McCarthy, 120 Wis. 288, 295,
97 N.W. 912), in our opinion the true rule, based
upon sound reason and supported by the greater
weight of authority, is that in the case of subcontracts, as in other cases of express agreements in writing, a reference by the contracting
parties to an extraneous writing for a particular
purpose makes it a part of their agreement only
for the purpose specified."
It is further argued by counsel for appellant at
page 23 of its brief that the $50.00 per day penalty clause
in the inserted typewritten provision did not· purport
to impose such penalty upon the subcontractor; that the
appropriate place to accomplish this would be in the
second paragraph of the second section of the subcontract
form which was left blank. We submit that this is not
the case. If it had not been the intention to charge the
defendants with a $50.00 per day penalty, there· would
have been no reason whatsoever in inserting the penalty
provision in the typewritten portion of the subcontract.
The typewritten provision specifically provided that time
was of the essence of the contract; that the defendants
would complete their work not only within 120 day time
limit, but, "as scheduled." The use of the $50.00 a day
penalty In connection with such language could have·
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only one Inea.ning, nainely, that the defendants would
be subjeet to a $50.00 per day penalty if they did not
co1nplete their contract "·ithin the time liinit and "as
scheduled." The reason the blanks were not filled in on
the second paragraph 'Yas because the 1natter had been
fully covered in the typewritten p·rovision. Since the
plaintiff had gone to the time and trouble to type the
specific provisions relative to time limit and penalty
into the printed form of contract, it certainly intended
that the defendants '""ere to be subject thereto, and we
submit that this is the only reasonable construction of
the proposed subcontract.
If, as plaintiff contends, the defendants' proposal
incorporated the ti1ne limit and penalty p·rovison because
the proposal stated that the work would be done pursuant to the Plans and Specifications, there would then
be no necessity for the plaintiff to typ·e in on its pTinted
form of subcontract this specific propos-al because the
printed provision of the contract likewise required the
defendants to perform and complete the work in accordanee with the Plans and Specifications. Certainly, at the
time the subcontract agreement was written, it was definitely felt by the plaintiff that the generai wording "to
complete in accordance with the Plans and Sp·e~cifica
tions" was not sufficient to bind the defendants to any
time limit or penalty pro¥ision, otherwis·e, therH would
have been no necessity of plaintiff's typing in this proVISion.
III.
The second paragraph of the second provision of
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the proposed subcontract agreement provides that the
defendants shall not he. held responsible for any delays
or interruptions caused by the neglect, delay or default
of the plaintiff or the owner or the archite-ct or any other
subcontractor and then contains the following provision:

"* * * and the subcontractor hereby waives
any and all claims upon the contractor for damages for any act, omission or delay caused by
the contractor, the owner, the architect, or any
other subcontractor, and hereby undertakes the
work subject to all conditions as they now exist
o~ rr1~y arise."
The full significance and import of this provision
In the proposed subcontract agreement can only be
realized when it is considered in connection with other
provisions of the proposed subcontract agreement.
The S'eventh paragraph of the subcontract agreement reads a·s follows:
"The sub-contractor shall hold and save
harmless the contractor, the owner and the architect from any and all liability, including costs and
expenses, in the perforn1ance of this sub-contract."
The tenth provision of the proposed subcontract,
among other things provides :
"Sub-contractor agrees to keep his own work
protected from damage by the elements and from
damage likely otherwise to be occasioned in the
performance of construction work and to protect
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all other parts of the work from damage likely
to be ca·used by the S·nb-contractor1 s work, a.nd
should any such damage be so cau.sed, to immediately repair the same. Any default of the Subcontractor in any stttch cleaning, protection, or
repairs, 1nay be remedied by the Contractor, and
the cost deducted fro·m the contract price."

The t\velfth provision of the proposed subcontract
agreement reads as follows:
""Neither the final payment nor any provision
in the contract documents shall relieve the Subcontractor of responsibility for faulty materials
or workmanship; and, unless otherwis-e specified,
he shall remedy any defects and pay for any damage to other work resulting therefrom, which shall
appear within one year from the date of com-·
pletion."
It can thus readily be s·een that under the. terms
and provisions of the prop-osed subcontract agreement
the defendants would not only have to guarantee their
work for a period of one year, but, in addition, would
have to repair any damage to the work of the general
contractor or any other subcontractor resulting from
any faulty performance of the work on the part of the
defendants. However, should the reverse situation take.
place and should the defendants sustain damage by
reason of any defective workmanship on the part of
the general contractor or another subcontractor, the
defendants under the proposed subcontract could not
claim any damages. They specifically waived the same,
and would have to assume the full responsibility of any
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such loss. No such provision can be found in the defendants' 'bid proposal or in the Plans and Specifications
the1nselves, or from the conversations between Riding
and Child. TheS'e provisions, and particularly, the proposed waiver by the defendants of any claim for damages for any act, omission or delay by the contractor,
owner, architect, or any other subcontractor can no
where be found in or reasonably read into the· defendants' proposal or in any provision of the Specifications
on which the proposal might have been made. The provisions are new and distinct provisions cre·ating substantially different rights and liabilities and depriving the
defendants of rights which by the contract were expressly reserved to the plaintiff as contractor and to other
subcontractors. These provisions materially altered the
defendants' proposal and accordingly constituted a rejection thereof.
We submit that any one of the above 3 mentioned
changes constituted material alterations in the defendants' bid proposal and that any one of such alterations
is of such a nature to make the proposed subcontract
agreement as a matter of law amount to a new proposal
and a rejection of the defendants' original proposal. The
original proposal having been rejected by the counterproposal, the same could not thereafter be revived unless the defendants chose to re-submit it which according
to the evidence they did not.
See Restatement of the Law of Contracts, S·ection
60, page· 66:
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....A. reply to an offer, though purporting to
accept it, "Thich adds qualifications or requires
perforn1anee of conditions, is not an acceptance
but is a counter-offer."

See also . .\.1n. J ur. \T ol. 12, page 543, Section 53:
·"In order to form a contract, the offer and
acceptance Inust express assent to one· and the
sa1ne thing. The acceptance of the offer must be
substantially as made; there· must be· no variance
bet,veen the acceptance and the offer. An offer
imposes no obligations until accepted according to
its terms, without qualification or departure.

* * * The acceptance must be unequivocal and
unconditional. If a condition is affixed to the
acceptance by the party to whom the offer is made
or any modification of, or change in, the offer is
made or requested, there is a rejection of the offer, which puts an end to the negotiations, unless
the party who made the original offer renews it or
assents to the modification suggested. The other
party, having once rejected the offer 'by a conditional acceptance, cannot afterwards revive it by
tendering an unconditional acceptance of it."
See also William E. Iselin v. United States, 70 Law
Ed. page 872 at page 874:
"It is well settled that a proposal to accept,
or an acceptance upon terms varying from those
offered is a rejection of the offer, and p·uts an en d
to the negotiation, unless the party who made the
original offer renews it, or assents to the modification suggested."
1
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See also Polhamus v. Roberts, (New Mexico 1946),
175 Pac. (2) 196. In that case the plaintiff sent the following wire :
"Will give two year lease on premises you
occupy at $175 monthly. I am also ill and contemplate sale of the building as soon as possible. If
you want lease please advise."
The defendant forwarded the following airmail
reply:
"Received your wire dated January 15, 1945,
agreeing to lease me the Green Lantern for two
years at $175 per month. I accept the lease proposition but as I wrote you before I am assigning
all of my lease rights to the parties to whom I
sold the bar, a Mr. J. A. Terry and Mr. Rulon
Moody, and they desire to have a written lease
from you, and consequently I have had a lease
drawn up between you and Terry and Moody
leasing this property for a term of two years.
"They have signed the lease in duplicate and
when you sign the same it will be complete. You
can keep one copy and mail the other copy bacl~
to me for the purchasers.
"I am also enclosing check of Moody and
Terry for $175 for the first month's rent beginning January 20, 1945.
''I am sure these parties I am selling to will
keep all rental paid promptly each month and will
take good care of the premises.
·"If the lease is not satisfactory you can draw
a new lease and send it down, but I think the lease
is okey.
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HTrusting I may hear fron1 you by return
1nail returning the signed copy of thH lease, and
\Yith best regards, I am, Etc."
The court held that the reply though purporting
to accept the ter1ns of the offer added the condition that
the written lease be 1nade to a third person to whom the
offeree \\~as assigning his lease rights; that this constituted a departure from the terms of the offer, and was
not a mere request of a favor to be complied with or not
at the offeror's option, hut was a condition of the acceptance and was, therefore, a counter-offer and gave
rise to no contract, quoting from RestatHment of Law
of Contracts, S.ection 60, as follows:

"A reply to an offer, though purporting to
accept it, which adds qualifications or requires
performance of conditions, is not an aeceptance
but is a counter-offer."
In Northea.stern Construction Company v. WinstonSalem, Fourth Circuit, 83 Fed. (2) 57, the city after calling for bid proposals for sewer work eliminated about
15% of the work that had originally been projected.
This was held to justify the successful bidder in withdrawing his bid and refusing to undertake the work since
obviou~ly

the minds of the parties never met. It was

further held that a stipulation in the specifications that
a certain official was to

ha~e

the right to eliminate any

part of the work did not authorize such an elimination
before a contract was entered into as against a bidder
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dicate what or whose figure the plaintiff had used in
co1nputing the brick "\Vork portion of the job. Assuming
that the plaintiff had used the defendants' figure, there
was nothing to prevent the plaintiff, even after the bids
had been opened and the Government had awarded its
contract, from soliciting bids from other subcontractors
for the brick work and giving the work to them. There
is nothing in the record to show that the plaintiff in fact
relied upon the defendants' bid because it could have
done the work itself or had it performed by some other
subcontractor. Since the plaintiff did not desire to bind
itself to give a contract to the defendants in the event
that the plaintiff was awarded the Government job, it
cannot claim the 'bene.fi t of any promissory estoppel.
Appellant relies upon the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as set forth in the Restatement of the Law of
Cnn tracts in Chapter 3, Section 90, and claims that the
case of Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 10
N.W. (2d) 879 is authority for the application of the
doctrine in the case at bar. However, an examination
of the facts in the Northwestern Engineering case will
readily disclose that it has no similarity to the facts at
issue in this case. In the Northwestern Engineering
Company case the plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a written agreement which, among other
things, recited that the plaintiff proposed to submit a
bid for the construction of a certain project; that the
defendant desired to subcontract a portion of the work
in the event that the plaintiff submitted the lowest bid
and was awarded the contract. It was further agreed
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in 'vri ting that if the plain tiff " . as a " . arded the con trart,
that the defendant \vould perforn1 a portion of the work
as a subcontractor on the terms stated in the written
agreen1ent, and the plaintiff agreed to 1nake payment
to the defendant in such event. This agreement was
signed by both parties. The defendant in fact submitted
a bidder's bond guaranteeing its p·erformance. In that
case, therefore, the plaintiff by writing obligated the defendant and itself to a subcontract in the event the. plaintiff \\. .as a\\rarded the general contract. The. plaintiff in
this case could have followed that procedure and p-rotected itself but chose not to do so, and obviously did not
desire to obligate itself in any way to the defendants.
The Northwestern Engineering case is, therefore, not in
point.
The doctrine of pron1issory estopp·el is one of limited application. It most generally is used in connection
with charitable subscriptions but has been extended to
a promise not to plead the statute of limitations or other
similar defense or to enforce marriage settlements based
upon a promise, but it is only in these types of cases that
the doctrine applies. See Williston on· Contracts, Sec.
139 commencing at page 494 :
"In the United States, the decisions which
have enforced pro1nises, confessedly because of
the promissee's action in reliance thereon have
generally been cases of. charitable subscriptions
where courts, dissatisfied with the prevailing
theories by which consideration is found for such
agreements, hut nevertheless dis.pose.d to follow
the weight of American authority in sustaining
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the subscriber's promise, have explained the liability on the ground of estoppel."
And again in that section :
"l)rornises of future action, it is generally
held, if they can furnish the basis for an estoppel
at all, can do so only where they relate to an intended abandonment of an existing right, and are
made to influence others who in fact are induced
thereby to act or forebear. * * *
"The law is clear that in any ca.se where a
party to a contract agrees to give up a possible
further defense or foregoes the· advantage of a
condition provided for his benefit in an existing
contract, the promise is binding if the promisee
relying thereon changes his position. In these
cases no new right is created. The court does
not maintain an action on the promise; it reaches
the desired result by allowing a defense to an
action or allowing an original right to be enforced by merely prohibiting the interposition
of a defense."
See also Williston on Contracts, Sec. 692 and 693,
commencing at page 1997, where it is clear that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is limited to cases which
recreate a liability which by its terms had been extinguished or to an obligation which by its te:rms has
already been extinguished or made impossible of performance.
Williston on Contracts, Sec. 140 states that the rule
as announced in the Restatement of the Law, Sec. 90 does
not go beyond the e·xisting law as enumerated in the
aforementioned sections.
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..:\. ease \Yhich in our opinion clearly shows that the
doctrine of pro1nissory estoppel does not apply is that of
James Baird Co. v. Gin1bel Bros., Inc., Second Circuit,
6-± Fed. (~) 3-1--±, decided by Judge Learned Hand. In
that case the plaintiff had n1ade a general contract for
the construction of a public building. The defendant had
subnritted a bid to the plaintiff for the supplying of linoleunl used in the building but through an error had underestimated the total yardage by about one-half of the
proper amount. When it discovered its error, the defendant "··ithdrew its offer, but the withdrawal was not
received until after the plaintiff had put in its bid on a
lump sum basis using the linoleum prices quoted by the
defendant. The plaintiff's bid as general contractor was
a"~arded and the defendant refused to recognize the
existence of a subcontract to furnish the linoleum. The
plaintiff sued the defendant. Judge Hand in that case
held that there was no contract and that the doctrine
of promissory estoppel did not apply. He said that the
plaintiff had a ready escape from its difficulty by insisting upon a contract fron1 the defendant before it used
the defendant's figures. This would be similar to the contract used in the Northwestern Engineering case. In
commenting upon Sec. 90 of the Restatement of the La.'v
of Contracts relative~ to the doctrine of promissory estoppel the court held that the doctrine did not apply
under the facts of the instant case, saying:
'~In

the case at bar the defendant offered to
deliver the linoleum in exchange for the p~laintiff's
acceptance, not for its bid, which was a matter
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of indifference to it. That offer could become
a promise to deliver only when the equivalent was
received ; that is, when the plain tiff promised to
take and pay for it. There is no room in such a
situation for the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel.'"
The facts in the case at bar are analogous to those
in the Ja,mes Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. case. Obviously, when the defendants submitted their bid they
were interested in obtaining a contract. They were not
interested in submitting a figure to the plaintiff which
the plaintiff might use in its lump sum bid, and subsequently perform the work itself or award the work to
some other subcontractor. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, when it took the bid was not interested in binding
itself to award a subcontract to the defendants in the
event that the plain tiff was a warded the job. It, therefore, is in no position to now claim that the defendants
are estopped to deny the existence of a contract.
POINT V.
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS. NO JURY ISSUES WERE PRESENT.

Both parties had entered into a stipulation and submitted the same, together with other evidence to the
Court to enable the Court as a matter of law to determine whether there was a contract between the parties.
At the pretrial counsel for the appellant conceded that
all of the conversations bearing on the point had been
reduced to deposition form and he knew of nothing then
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that \vould change such testitnony. (R. 50-51) Without
repeating our preYious argu1nents, \ve subrnit that the
evidence clearly indicated that there was no contract
as a 1natter of la,v.
The apellant cornplains that there 'vere- disputed
facts frorn \vhich a jury could have found that the defendants' offer had been accepted by the· p[aintiff. We
submit that such is not the case. The-re was no material
disagreement in the essential facts as testified to by
Child and Riding in their depositions. Both agre,ed that
all of their conversations prior to the mailing of the
printe-d form of contract by the plaintiff to the defendants were of a preliminary nature. Riding positively
testified to this effect and admitted that there had been
no acceptance of the defendants' p-roposal in any of those
conversations. There was, accordingly, no disputed issue
to be submitted to the jury.
..._-\_ppellant again cites the· case of Thornton v. Pasch,
104 Utah 313, 139 Pac. (2d) 1002, which we have discussed elsewhere (supra, p. 24) in our brief and have
shown ,was not in point under the facts in this case.
Appellant further contends that there was a disagreement between Riding and Child as to the date on
which the conversation relative to the placing of reinforcing steel took place and that if Riding's testimony were
believed an inference of acceptance might be drawn.
This is not the case because regardless of the date Riding admitted that at the time of such conve-rsation there
had been no acceptance and that it was still just p·reliminary negotiations.
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Counsel also persists in stating that there was a difference between Riding and Child as to whether the defendants had ordered brick for the job and that this
should be a jury question. This has been fully covered
in our brief, (supra, p. 23). There was no substantial difference betvveen Riding and Child in this regard. Child
testified that he did not order any brick and Riding
testified that he was not certain whether Child had used
the word 'order' or not.
By the clear and unmistakable statements and admissions of Riding there had been no acceptance of the
defendants' proposal prior to the time that the written
contract was mailed to the defendants from the plaintiff's
California office, and, as we have seen in our discussion
under Point IV the mailing of the subcontract form itself
was a counter-proposal and a rejection of the defendants' original proposal. The lower court, therefore,
properly held as a matter of law that there was no contract between the parties.
POINT VI.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
FORMAL WRITTEN MOTION WITH NOTICE THEREOF
WERE NOT REQUIRED AND IN ANY EVENT WERE
WAIVED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT.

Appellant's counsel complains that no formal motion
to dismiss under Rule 12 (c) was made and that no notice of such motion was served upon the plaintiff. This
is a unique objection in view of the fact that both parties
were in attendance at the pre-trial conference which "Tas
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for the very purpose of sub1nitting sufficient facts or
data to ena:ble the Court to rule on the question as a matter of la,v. In fact, the parties had gone to the time
and trouble to prepare a written stipulation to aid the
Court in this regard . .At the conclusion of the pre-trial
conference the Court asked the p-arties if they desired
to make a motion and both so indicated and dictated their
respective motions into the record. The plaintiff knew
'vhat the respective motions were and, as a matter of
fact, prepared a written 1nemorandum commencing at
R. 67 'vhich "\vas entitled, "Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Hold the Case for Trial
for Assessment of Damages." In other words, both parties at the pre-trial hearing made motions. Neither made
any objection to the manner in which the motions were
made. Both prepared written memorandums which were
submitted to the court at the time of the argument on the
motions which was several days after the motions had
been made and which date was agreed upon by the attorneys for the p·arties. If any notice or formal written
motion were required, the same had been waived.
Appellant also complains that Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law were not prepared and signed
by the Court. Rule 12 (b) provides for a motion to dismiss and ·states that if "matters outside· the pleading are
presented to and not excluded 'by the. court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Rule 52 specifically
provides, "Findings of F·act and Conclusions of Law
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are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12
or 56 * * * ." We submit that the defendants' motion
was a motion to dismiss where matters outside the pleading were presented to the court in support thereof, and
under such circumstances no Findings of F'act or Conclusions of Law were necessary. However, in any event
the plaintiff herein waived Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law since it prepared the written order upon 'vhich it has based its appeal and appellant did not see
the necessity of submitting any Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law in support of said order.
The plaintiff certainly understood from the motions
and its conduct at the pre-trial hearing that the purpose
of the motions was to permit the court to rule as a matter
of law whether there was a contract between the parties.
In fact, the plaintiff by its motion claimed that there
was no material issue of fact and moved that the court
find the existence of a contract and order the case for
trial with the only question being the amount of the damages to be awarded. Neither party desired to go to the
expense of a lengthy trial in which testimony as to accounting and damages would be involved when both felt
that the case could be decided as a matter of law on the
basis of the stipulated facts and evidence subinitted to
the court at the time of the pre-trial hearing. Both parties desired the court to rule on the question of the existence of a contract as a matter of law. We submit that
both parties agreed to the· procedure followed and that
such procedure particularly under the circumstances was
a proper application of the motion to dismiss and motion
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for sun1n1ary judgment. There was no genuinH dispute
between the parties on the n1aterial issues, and the record
clearly indicated that there was no contract between the
parties as a matter of la\v.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
trial court should be affir1ned.
BENJAMIN L. RICH
GORDON R. S·TRONG
RICH

&

STRONG

604-610 Boston ·Building
Salt Lake City, U'tah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

